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EMPLOYEES AS FIDUCIARIES OF THEIR EMPLOYERS.
No principle is more firmly settled than that a court of equity
exacts fidelity and loyalty from agents and fiduciaries of every sort
to their principal, and will strip them of all advantages obtained by
breach of trust and confidence. It will clothe them with the
character and responsibility of trustees as respects dealings and
purchases which involve a breach of good faith, and will turn over
upon just terms the fruits of such transactions to the principal:
Gienwater8 v. Miller, 49 Miss. 150, 166. This is a rule of
elementary law supported by an almost endless array of citations
from English and American text writers, as well as by a multitude
of cases illustrative of the manifold application of the principle by
the Federal and the various state courts, together with those of the
mother country. The principle might also be fortified by citations
from the civil law. It is a fundamental doctrine of equity juris-
prudence, and has, so often as a case came before them, received
the sanction of the purest and most illustrious chancellors and
equity lawyers. It prevails wherever the rule of conscience and
good morals has found a home. The only questions that can arise
in connection with the rule are: Is the person a fiduciary within
its scope? Was his conduct such as to fall within its meaning?
It is not unfrequently attempted to restrict the rule to persons
who are expressly created the agents, trustees, executors, adminis-
trators, guardians or attorneys of the beneficiaries. This narrow
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construction of the rule has never been sanctioned. The criterion
by which to judge whether the person is within the rule is, not the
technical name-attorney, guardian or trustee-by which he has
been designated, but the relation subsisting between him and his
beneficiary. Is it a fiduciary relation ? Does it imply trust and
confidence, together with the knowledge of another's affairs. If so,
then he is a fiduciary within the rule. Thus directors, officers,
agents and employees of corporations or of firms, attorneys, execu-
tors, administrators, guardians, any and all persons who are placed
in such relation to another, by the act or consent of that other, or
the act of a third person, or of the law, that they become interested
for him, "or interested with him in any subject of property or
business, are prohibited from acquiring rights in that subject
antagonistic to the person with whose interests they have become
associated. Lord ST. LEONARDS says: "It may be laid down as a
general proposition that trustees who have accepted the trust (unless
they are nominally such to preserve contingent remainders), agents,
commissioners of bankrupts, assignees of bankrupts, or their part-
ners in business, solicitors to the commission, auctioneers, or others
who have been consulted as to the mode of sale, counsel or any
person who being employed or concerned in the affairs of another
have acquired a knowledge of his property, are incapable of pur-
chasing said property themselves except under the restrictions
which will shortly be mentioned. * * * For if persons having
confidential character were permitted to avail themselves of any
knowledge acquired in that~capacity, they might be induced to con-
ceal their information, and not to exercise it for the benefit of per-
sons relying on their integrity. The characters are inconsistent:"
Sugden on Vendors and Purchasers (14th ed.) 406, top page. The
breadth and scope of his lordship's propositions are especially
noticeable. Even more so are Mr. Bispham's observations. "The
rule under discussion applies not only to persons standing in a
direct fiduciary relation towards others, as trustees, executors,
attorneys and agents, but also to those who occupy any position out
of which a, similar duty ought in equity and good morals to arise.
Thus it will be enforced against partners, tenants in common, tenants
for life, mortgagees, a husband, attorneys at law, and vendees under(
articles, in favor of copartners, cotenants, tenants in remainder,
aortgagors, a wife, clients and vendors, respectively; and these
instances must be considered only as illustrations of the principle
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and not as an exhaustive catalogue of the Tarties to whom it will be
confined." Bispham's Equity, sect. 93.
Having broadly indicated the persons falling within the scope
of the principle, it will be interesting to examine some of the cases
upon the very borderland of its application. Winn employed
Dillon to obtain for him certain information as to lands in order
that he might enter them, which information Dillon gave, but
afterwards entered the same in his own name. He was not
employed by Winn to enter them for him, but only to furnish him
this information. It was held, that a relation of private trust and
confidence was thus created which disabled Dillon from doing any
act or acquiring any interest in the property adverse to the interest
of Winn: Winn v. Dillon, 27 Miss. 494, citing Murphey v. Sloan,
24 Miss. 658.
Another case, in Wisconsin, involved the sale of a company's
property to, among others, its superintendent, concerning whom
the court, by RYAN, C. J., in deciding the sale voidable, said:
' The superintendent appears to have occupied such a confidential
position under the corporation. He appears to have had the
principal charge of the general business of the corporation, appar-
ently of all its business, possibly with exceptions not material here.
The prosperity of the corporation was thus largely dependent upon
him. He appears to have been in charge of the books, accounts,
vouchers, papers, &c., of the corporation. He thus had peculiar
opportunity of intimate and accurate knowledge of its affairs, per-
haps better than the other officers, certainly better than stockholders
not officers. He must have been presumed to have been intimately
and accurately acquainted with the financial condition and prospects
of the corporation, perhaps better than the other officers, certainly
better than stockholders not officers. He stood toward the cor-
poration in very much the same relation as the agents and stewards
in the English cases stood toward their principals." Cook v. Ber-
lin W. M. Co., 43 Wis. 433, 444. See also, Blake v. Buffalo
Creek Rd. Co., 56 N. H. 485.
In another instance plaintiffs were warehousemen, having in their
employ one Andrew, as clerk or agent in and about their business.
He had access to their books and papers and knowledge of their
business and customers. Plaintiffs' lease of the premises occupied
by them was about to expire, and they were negotiating with ,the
landlord for a renewal of it. During the negotiation Andrew,
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without authority from the plaintiffs, told the landlord that they
would probably give up the warehouse, and if so, he would take it,
and the landlord, without receiving definite information from the
plaintiffs that they intended to surrender the premises, but believ-
ing such would be the case, gave Andrew and an associate a lease
of them. Andrew's object in obtaining the lease was to go into
the warehouse business on his own account, and he solicited from
some of the plaintiffs' customers their storage, stating that he had
become the lessee of the warehouse because Gower & Gilman (the
plaintiffs), did not want it any longer. During all this time An-
drew was in the employ of plaintiffs, but he was dismissed as soon
as they learned he had taken the lease, and an injunction. applied
for. MYRICK, J., for the court, said: "We think the injunction
should have been granted. * * * We understand it to be the duty
of the employee to devote his entire acts, so far as his acts may
affect the business of his employer, to the interests and service of
the employer; that he can engage in no business detrimental to
the business of his employer; and that he should in no casebe per-
mitted to do for his own benefit that which would have the. effect of
destroying the business to sustain and carry on which his services
have been secured. * * * It seems to us that if Andrew desired
to engage in the -same business as his employers, on his own ac-
count, a very plain and very proper course was open to him, viz.:
to state to them all the facts and ask them to determine -whether
they desired a renewal. By pursuing the course which he did he
gave Hopkins the landlord an inducement not only not to give plain-
tiffs a renewal at a decreased rental, but also an inducement not to
renew at the then rental; and he compelled plaintiffs to have an
unknown competitor who based his action upon knowledge acquired
by him while in their employ. We do not think that this is equity,
or good conscience." Gower v. Andrews, 59 Cal. 119.
The question was even more thoroughly examined in Davis v.
Hamlin, 108 Ill. 39. In this case Hamlin, the lessee of the Grand
Opera House in Chicago, employed Davis as manager. Acting as
manager Davis corresponded with parties having attractions in
reference to the terms on which they could be engaged, allotted to
these attractions the time they were to occupy the house, employed
the workmen, supernumeraries, orchestra and other theatrical help,
supervised books and accounts, paid bills, and made nightly settle- -
ments with parties performing at the house, and in general did
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everything which a proprietor or manager of a theatre usually does,
subject only to Hamlin's approval or veto. He knew the theatre
was profitable property and conceived the idea of securing the re-
newal of the lease of it to himself. He went to the owner of the
premises, Borden, and made an offer to rent the theatre at a rental
of $5000 in excess of Hamlin's offer. This offer was secret, and
in reply to Hamlin's inquiry whether he was bidding for the house
he denied that he was doing so and advised Hamlin not to offer
more than a reasonable price for it. He secured the lease, and
Hamlin filed a bill to enjoin him from transferring it to innocent
parties without notice and to compel its assignment to him. Davis
claimed that he was not within the rule giving a cestui que trust
the benefit of his trustee's acts, because he had not been employed
to procure leases, but only to act as manager of the theatre; that it
was no part of his duties as business manager to obtain a new lease
of the theatre. Chancellor TULEY, in deciding the case at nisi
Prius, said: "1 cannot agree with defendant's counsel in this nar-
row limitation of this broad principle of equity founded upon good
morals and public policy. I do not deem it necessary that a confi-
dential employee in a business, in order to come within the rule,
should have any specific duty to perform in a matter which may
affect that business. His duty need not necessarily be an active
duty. It may be one of abstention only, or negative in its
character. In this case it was clearly the duty of Davis to
abstain from doing anything which would interfere with his em-
ployer in his efforts to obtain an extension of his lease. It was
his duty not to overbid his employer. It was his duty not to
place himself in a position where his duty as employee and his
interest would come in conflict. It was his duty to inform his em-
ployer of all facts coming to his knowledge touching the re-leasing
of the theatre; but in place thereof he concealed from him and
denied his own efforts to obtain the lease, thereby practically remov-
ing the competition of his employer." * * * "If Davis had gone to
Borden (the landlord) and offered Borden that he would use his
confidential relation with Hamlin-his influence over Hamlin-to
induce him to pay a much larger rental than he (Hamlin) was wil-
ling to pay if he (Borden) would give him (Davis) 10 per cent. of
the rental value Hamlin should agree to pay, and Borden had ac-
cepted, and had thereby obtained a greater rental from Hamlin,
could it be doubted for one moment but that a court of equity would
480 EMPLOYEES AS FIDUCIARIES OF THEIR EMPLOYERS.
say to Davis: 'You cannot in good morals hold that 10 per cent.
of the rental for your own use-it must be turned into the business
of which you agreed to take the 10 per cent. of the net profits '
Would not any court of justice stamp the act as one of breach of
confidence and treachery on the part of Davis towards Hamlin ?"
"If such would be .the nature of the act supposed, how can his
conduct be defensible in the present case when receiving 10 per
cent. of the net profits (this was Davis's compensation) he attempts
to oust his employer from the entire business and appropriate all
the profits to his own use." (Per TULEY, J., decision not printed.)
This view was upheld by the appellate court, and ultimately by
the Supreme Court of Illinois, and which said in reply to the con-
tention that the relation between Hamlin and Davis was that of
master and servant, or employer and employee, that the rule has
never been applied to that relation as a class, and that the classes
coming within the principle are those embraced within the list of
defined confidential relations, such as trustee and beneficiary, guar-
dian and ward, &c. " The subject is not comprehended within any
such narrowness of view as is presented on appellant's part. In
applying the rule it is the nature of the relation which is to be re-
garded, and not the designation of the one filling the relation."
Per SHELDON, C. J., in .Davis v. Hamlin, 108 Ill. 48. See also
Gree.nlaw v. King, 5 Jur. 19; Hamilton v. Wriqht, 9 C1. & Fin.
111; Keech v. Sandford, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 53; .Devall v. Bur-
bridge, 4 W. & S. 805 ; Bill v. Frazier, 22 Penn. St. 320 ; Fair-
man v. Bavin, 29 Ill. 75 ; Gilman, C. & S. Railroad Co. v. Kelly,
77 Ill. 426 ; Bennett v. Van Sycckel, 4 Duer 462; Gillenwaters v.
Miller, 49 Miss. 150; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 446.
There may even be no relation of employer and employee, mas-
ter and servant, attorney and client, &c., &c., existing, and still the
parties may occupy such a position toward each other of trustee and
cestui que trust. -Ex varte Hughes, 6 Vesey 624, illustrates this
point. In that case the contract was one of sale. The person
making it did not sustain as to the person as to whom the contract
was declared iroid any relation of trustee or agent. He was simply
his creditor. It was intended by the debtor's representative, a re-
ceiver, to have a sale of the debtor's property, and a consultation
was in progress in a private room as to the upset price to be fixed
for said sale. Pending this discussion, Mr. Hughes, the creditor,
entered. and was informed that there was a difference of opinion
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among those present as to what price certain of the property should
be put up for sale, and Mr. Hughes's views were solicited- He
said he would abide by what one Mr. Dyke thought right, that gen-
tleman having heard the views of those advocating the different
prices, thought the property should be put up at 20001., and to this
Mr. Hughes assented. It was accordingly put up at 20001., with a
declaration that if any one advanced upon that sum it would be
knocked down to him. After a considerable time, no one bidding,.
Hughes advanced 101., and was declared the purchaser. Lord
ELDoN said: "* * * I do not impute fraud to Hughes. *** The
first question is very considerable: whether Hughes could be per-
mitted to bid. It is not necessary to give an opinion upon that,
but I will go the length of saying it is extremely difficult in equity
to sustain the title of a person dealing under the circumstances in
which he then stood. If Hughes could bid, or the solicitor tender-
ing the estate to sale, or agents for the sale however constituted,
and if the danger of that species of transaction is compared with
the danger of a purchase by a trustee, the court would overlook a
danger far more considerable than that at which it looks with so
much anxiety." See also Torrey v. Bank of New Orleans, 9 Paige
649; Greenlaw v. King, 5 Jur. 18, where Lord COTTENHAM
approves Ex Tarte Hughes.
The principle deducible from all the cases is that where a man is
employed in anywise on another's behalf or occupies any fiduciary
relation towards such other, no matter how such employment or
relation may have arisen or been created, he cannot take to himself
any benefit growing out of the subject-matter of the employment or
relation, whatever may be the manner of the taking. An employee,
agent or fiduciary cannot make himself an adverse party to his
principal. This is a consequence of the confidential relation sub.
sisting between the parties, and not of the fact that one of them is
technically named an agent, or guardian, or attorney or other well-
known designation of trust. The criteriop is the relation not the
name. Nor is there room for any moral hair-splitting or sophistical
reasoning in applying the rule to all fiduciaries whatsoever. The
principle is not to be trifled away. It is a just rule, sanctioned by
the promptings of every honest man's heart and conscience. It
should be firmly upheld and applied, whether a precedent be found
for applying it to the case in hand or not. It is enough if such a
case be within the principle and the reason thereof. It cannot be
